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 RECLAIMING METAPHYSICAL TRUTH FOR
 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
 by ROBERT WILLMOTT
 ABSTRACT: It is not uncommon in educational research and social
 science in general either to eschew the word truth or to put it in scare
 quotes in order to signify scepticism about it. After the initial wave of
 relativism in the philosophy of natural science, a second wave has devel-
 oped in social science with the rise of postmodernism and poststructur-
 alism. The tendency here is to relativise truth or to bracket out questions
 of truth. In contradistinction, this paper revindicates the metaphysical
 nature of truth. Truth is a transcendental precondition of educational
 inquiry and is best understood as a formal, regulative norm. Realism
 about truth enjoins a defence of the correspondence theory, which is pro.
 vided here. At the same time, however, the development of realism in the
 social sciences has ironically followed the postmodernists in its scepticism
 about truth and its rejection of the correspondence theory. This paper
 critically appraises such recent developments, since all research is un-
 intelligible without realism about the social world and whether our
 substantive knowledge-claims correspond with it.
 Keywords: truth, correspondence theory, ontology, realism, relativism
 1. INTRODUCTION
 The rationale behind writing this paper is in part defensive. Just over
 a decade ago, realists wrote books with titles like Reclaiming Reality
 (Bhaskar, 1989) and Reality at Risk (Trigg, 1989). More recently, some
 have been compelled to reclaim Humanity itself (Archer, 2000),
 which is indeed at risk. Well, at least in academic circles, 'where
 strident voices would dissolve the human being into discursive
 structures and humankind into a disembodied textualism. Outside
 of Academia, ordinary people act in undemolished fashion - they
 confront the world, meaning nature and practice .. .' (Archer, 2000,
 p. 2). Equally, I would add that such ordinary people function with a
 metaphysical definition of truth. Or, rather, they could not function
 without it. Truth is a precondition for learning and language-use.
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 The ordinary definition of truth is metaphysical because it is congru-
 ent with realism about the external world, that is, that the world
 exists independently of our conception of it. As Bhaskar argues, 'it
 is in virtue of its world-reporting meaning that truth-talk satisfies a
 transcendental-axiological need, acting as a steering mechanism for
 language-users to find their way about the world' (1994, pp. 62-63).
 However, both the metaphysical definition of truth and truth qua
 regulative norm have come increasingly under attack in educational
 research (as in social science in general). For example, Elizabeth
 Atkinson writes:
 The postmodern challenge.., .has existed outside the educa-
 tional field for many years, but has brought its focus to bear for at
 least the past decade, for example in the work of Cherryholmes
 (1988), Ball (1990, 1995), Nespor and Barber (1991), Lather (1991,
 1993), Sanger (1994, 1995) and Stronach and MacLure (1997).
 These theorists, and others, challenge us to rethink our approach
 to both education and research, and to question the certainty with
 which to set out to seek the truth... With Ball (1995, p. 268), I
 would wish to propose 'a model of the educational theorist as a
 cultural critic offering perspective rather than truth .. .' (Atkinson,
 2000, p. 327).
 It is precisely such denigration (or rejection) of truth by education
 researchers that led David Bridges to defend the pursuit of truth in
 educational research. As he puts it:
 I am prompted to engage in this discussion by, in particular, my
 experience of recent educational conferences in which I have
 observed, among the majority of more pedestrian contributions
 ... an increasing number of (often interesting) papers in which
 the notion of 'truth' (or 'Truth') is referred to in inverted
 commas... or claims to the truth of beliefs are denied in favour
 of, for example, some kind of theory of political dominance or
 multiple subjectivities; or the very notion of the truth of beliefs is
 assumed under some apparent orthodoxy to be already ruled out
 of court. Such standpoints are in some but by no means all cases
 associated with a declared 'postmodernist' stance (Bridges, 1999,
 pp. 597-598, original emphases).
 Equally, at the September 2000 British Educational Research Associ-
 ation's (BERA) conference, at Cardiff University, I was surprised that
 academic papers were presented pro et contra truth. When I suggested
 to one presenter that propositions instantiate truth (or falsity) and
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 proffered the proposition that 'there is an empty can of diet coke in
 front of me', she replied that she was not interested in cans of diet
 coke! I also suggested that to criticise social practices and ideas as
 ideological presupposes truth. I was offered no satisfactory rejoinder.
 Of course, that the presenter was not interested in cans of diet coke
 was a separate matter: like Bridges, I was trying simply to make clear
 that we cannot dispense with the pursuit of truth in educational
 research. For
 [w]ithout a strong and ever-present sense of truth-seeking, along
 with a recognition that truth is very hard to find, inquiry becomes
 impossible, and academia becomes little more than a forum for
 political whim and fancy (Bailey, 2001, p. 170).1
 I am sure that Ball et al. do not view their work in terms of polit-
 ical whim and fancy. Yet Bailey's transcendental2 defence of truth
 underpinning educational inquiry enjoins that such charges will
 ever be prosecuted until such 'cultural critics offering perspective'
 properly put their cards on the table and make truth-claims about
 educational policy and practice. But, of course, 'offering perspective'
 is a back-door way of making truth-claims. Academic discourse is
 simply unintelligible without it and any claim to the contrary removes
 the rationale for such 'critical perspective-making'. Why else do so
 many of us lament the deleterious impact of managerialism on chil-
 dren's learning? It is not so much a question of why but of how: our
 capacity to provide an explanatory critique of managerialism derives
 from the nature of social reality and its correspondence with our
 substantive knowledge-claims.
 Now, we do need to pause a moment, for this paper's foray into
 social realism, truth and the correspondence theory might well be
 viewed by some as unnecessarily recondite, that is, 'too' philosoph-
 ical and/or social scientific.3 Pring (2000, p. 158) maintains that
 research into educational practice cannot simply be a branch of the
 social sciences, though adds that the social sciences provide tools for
 the educational researcher. Moreover, he writes that' ... in resisting
 the social sciences, so have educational researchers questioned the
 relevance of notions such as 'truth', 'knowledge', 'objectivity', 'real-
 ity', 'causality'. In this I believe they are mistaken and have caused
 much harm...' (Pring, 2000, p. 159). There are two points to be
 made here. First, whilst an excessive preoccupation with metaphysics
 would understandably warrant dismissal by some because of its lack
 of practical import, all educational research makes ontological
 assumptions about the social world, explicitly or implicitly.4 In the
 case of the metaphysics of truth, especially the correspondence theory,
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 the need to grapple with the complexity of the debate is crucial pre-
 cisely because the very concept of research, as Pring immediately adds,
 is unintelligible without it. Second, such harm is not simply 'aca-
 demic': the pursuit of social justice presupposes truth. Indeed, our
 ineluctably moral endeavours to assess the 'politics of the possible'
 are unintelligible without it.
 As Bhaskar argues (1989, p. 1), we need to take philosophy seri-
 ously because it underwrites what constitutes science and knowledge
 and which political practices are deemed legitimate. What needs to
 be taken seriously here is the metaphysical nature of truth and the
 correspondence theory. As Pring puts it, there is an 'inevitable cor-
 respondence between what is said and what is, even if that corre-
 spondence is not of the simplistic kind outlined in 'picture theory of
 meaning'. Realism and accounts of reality and truth are inseparable,
 and failure to recognize that leads to strange and indefensible con-
 sequences in the theory and practice of research' (2000, p. 74, ori-
 ginal emphasis). However, not all realists accept the correspondence
 theory of truth. It will be argued that such theorists confuse or con-
 flate truth with the processes and mechanisms involved in its instan-
 tiation. It is precisely because we cannot avoid realism in educational
 research that the inconsistencies and confusions within the social
 realist corpus itself be scrutinised and ironed out.
 2. TRUTH: METAPHYSICAL OR EPISTEMIC?
 As Jubien (1997) notes, philosophers have proposed many different
 analyses and characterisations of truth, which tend to be either epis-
 temic or metaphysical. On the metaphysical view, truth is a property
 that can only be instantiated by propositions. True propositions are
 those that correspond with reality ('it is true that the can of diet coke
 is in front of me'). As Jubien notes, truth is a relational property of
 the propositions that instantiate it:
 Because propositions are mind-independent entities, and because
 the world is, in general, independent of our minds, whether a
 given proposition is true has nothing to do with whether anyone
 knows it, believes it, has any evidence for it, or any justification for
 believing it or asserting it, etc. In other words, this notion of truth
 has no epistemic content whatsoever. It's strictly a matter between
 the proposition and the world. (1997, pp. 79-80)
 This is not to suggest that some propositions do not concern epis-
 temic matters. The point is that the truth (or falsity) of such proposi-
 tions is independent of whether anyone knows it, believes it or has
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 evidence for it. On some epistemic views, truth may also be seen as
 a property, but not a property of propositions. Rather, it would be a
 property of sentences. Other epistemic views treat truth as a relation
 between sentences and some other entities, e.g. coherence theory of
 truth, where truth is relation between coherent sets of beliefs or theor-
 ies, and not something independent of such beliefs or theories. The
 consensus theory treats truth as a relation between theories or
 beliefs and groups.5
 Now, as Jubien reminds us, if we think about how we actually use
 the words 'true' and 'truth' in everyday life, it is clear that we use
 them overwhelmingly in accordance with the metaphysical concep-
 tion. Indeed, as he rightly argues, in our practical affairs, we always
 separate questions of truth from questions of belief or justification
 or acceptance. Crucially, then, none of the epistemic concepts 'can
 possibly be a correct analysis of the concept of truth, because that
 concept is non-epistemic at its source' (Jubien, 1997, p. 82).
 3. TRUTH: IF NOT EPISTEMIC, THEN RELATIVE?
 The consensus theory enjoins that truth is relative to the say-so of a
 group (or nation). Relativism is a familiar part of the social science
 and educational landscape. As one delegate at the BERA confer-
 ence remarked in response to Richard Pring's contribution, truth
 'belongs' to specific (in this case, ethnic) groups. In other words,
 'we' have our truths and 'they' have theirs. This is a classic endorse-
 ment of relativism about truth. In clarifying what is meant by 'truth
 is relative', Jubien recommends that we consider a familiar analog-
 ous claim from physics:
 No object is absolutely at rest (or absolutely in motion). An object
 can only be relatively at rest (or relatively in motion). Every object
 is at rest relative to (or with respect to, etc.) some reference frames
 and in motion relative to others. (Jubien, 1997, p. 83)
 This is the doctrine of relativity: being at rest and being in motion
 are not properties of things; the concepts of rest and motion are rela-
 tions that hold between objects and reference frames. As he points
 out, this is no different with truth, or with any other concept that is
 claimed to be relative: 'When we say that a given proposition is true,
 it sounds like we're just saying that a certain thing, the proposition,
 has a certain property, the property of being true' (1997, p. 84, original
 emphasis). Relativism, in contrast, is the view that being true is not
 a property, but a relation between the proposition and something
 else. Almost invariably that something else is a person, a culture or
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 conceptual scheme. The pressing question for realists like myself
 is why people, particularly students, are attracted to relativism.6
 Andrew Sayer argues that the most common motive among students
 is a fear that accepting the possibility of distinguishing truth from fal-
 sity will require one to pronounce the beliefs of others as false.
 Relativism appears to have the virtue of being egalitarian and
 open-minded, avoiding implications that others are 'falsely
 conscious'. Even if one rejects an absolutist view of truth and
 proposes, as I have done, that absolute truth is either meaningless
 or unattainable, but that one can nevertheless distinguish better
 from worse ideas, some relativists seem to find this unpalatable
 too... The principle of equality applies to the moral worth of
 persons, not to the epistemological status of their empirical
 beliefs... (Sayer, 2000, p. 48)
 Of course, in order to distinguish 'better' from 'worse' ideas presup-
 poses metaphysical truth! Confusion can readily be dispelled here.
 Confusion about the doctrine of absolutism can easily arise because
 the terms 'absolute' and 'absolutely' are ambiguous - we often use
 these terms to convey certainty or to claim knowledge (Jubien,
 1997). However, the doctrine of absolutism is simply the claim that
 truth is a property of propositions rather than a relation between
 propositions and entities. It is not concerned with knowledge, belief,
 conviction or certainty.
 Perhaps, then, authors like Atkinson are concerned to eschew
 arrogant over-confidence in their truth-claims. Or, indeed, they do
 not wish to impose in papal-like fashion substantive knowledge-claims
 on others. Whilst this is entirely laudable, we must not lose sight of
 the fact that fallibility presupposes metaphysical truth and vice versa
 (if we can never be right, then we can never be wrong). It seems to
 me that some writers have (consistently) eschewed truth precisely
 because it is argued, wrongly, that certainty is an impossible fancy.
 However, the real problem arises when it is argued that we can never
 be certain, or sure, or 'absolute' about the truth status of our sub-
 stantive knowledge-claim(s). For example, Hammersley, as we have
 seen (see note 4), underscores a realist approach to educational
 research. But he vitiates the realist enterprise when he adds that
 '... true knowledge is true by virtue of the fact that it corresponds
 to the phenomena it is intended to represent (though, as I indi-
 cated, we can never be certain that any knowledge claim is true)'
 (1992, p. 51, original emphasis). If this were the case, then one won-
 ders whether Hammersley would, for example, be prepared to visit
 a friend in hospital upon receiving a call confirming that 'yes, it is
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 true that your friend has been taken to hospital'. To elevate uncer-
 tainty into an all-engulfing epistemological normative procedure is a
 recipe for disaster (and cannot eschew the slippery slope of relativism,
 notwithstanding Hammersley's attachment to ontological realism).
 Hammersley's position is technically referred to as fallibilism in
 philosophy (which is not to be confused with fallibility). Here, any
 theory or belief may be false. In essence, according to fallibilism,
 nothing about the world can be known for certain: no amount or
 quality of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation is sufficient to
 guarantee truth or falsity. Fallibilism is consistent with realism, but
 insists that human beings are epistemologically limited to the extent
 that they can never be sure whether they have in fact attained truth-
 status for their propositions. However, as Fay (1996) rightly points
 out, can realism remain persuasive once a fallibilist approach is
 adopted? Ineluctably, it expunges the rationale for any type of
 research. In contradistinction, we must recognise that our fallibility
 does not mean that we can never be right: some of our knowledge
 is true (it is true at this moment in space-time that I am writing this
 paper). Exactly how much of our knowledge is not the issue.7 If it is
 assumed a priori that we can never be sure about whether our pro-
 positions correspond (or do not correspond) with certain states of
 affairs, then, to reiterate, the rug is removed from under the educa-
 tional researcher's feet.
 Indeed, it seems to me that relativism-cum-nihilism is the end
 result of fallibilism, since we can never know if we have in fact
 attained the truth. If we cannot know for sure that the payment-by-
 results system was inimical to children's learning, then what is the
 point of engaging in any form of critique underpinned by values that
 accord primacy to the welfare of children? Indeed, why bother criti-
 quing the (new) managerialisation of education? It is easy to dis-
 pense with relativism about truth, since it involves a performative
 contradiction that, as Sayer (2000) notes, invites ridicule - 'there is
 no truth beyond whatever anyone defines as truth - and that's the
 truth!' In order to avoid the nihilist-cum-relativist morass, we must,
 along with Hammersley, separate ontology and epistemology and
 reaffirm our fallibility (as opposed to fallibilism). Indeed, the main
 challenge to relativism (in all its guises) has come from critical real-
 ism, whose chief proponent is Roy Bhaskar. Central here is (among
 other things) the distinction between a realm of intransitive objects,
 processes and events - i.e. those that must be taken to exist inde-
 pendently of human conceptualisations - and, on the other hand, a
 transitive realm of knowledge-constitutive interests that are subject to
 critical assessment. To conflate the intransitive and transitive realms
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 is the cardinal error of relativist philosophies (Norris, 1994; Scott,
 2000). As Norris notes, it also leads to disabling consequences in the
 ethical and socio-political spheres of enquiry.
 Thus it relativises 'truth' (in the natural and human sciences alike)
 to whatever form of discourse - or de facto regime of instituted
 power/knowledge - happens to prevail in some given discipline at
 some given time. And it also undermines any critical questioning
 of scientific projects, investigations or research programmes for
 human individual and collective well-being. (1994, p. 160)
 As Norris adds, Bhaskar's reason for his intransitive/transitive dis-
 tinction derives from (a) the fact that it is a necessary condition of
 possibility for science, i.e., science would be unintelligible in the
 absence of a presupposed object-domain that is not simply a con-
 struct of our various schemes; and (b) the relativists err in confusing
 ontological and epistemological issues - they mistakenly hold onto-
 logy to be synonymous with epistemology.
 More recently, Bhaskar has undertaken to develop a theory of
 truth congruent with critical realist philosophy. In 1993 he intro-
 duced the concept of 'alethic truth'. With the exception of Ruth
 Groff (2000), Bhaskar's thinking about the concept of truth has
 received little explicit attention. The next section will address the
 serious inadequacies of Bhaskar's theorising about truth. Following
 Groff, it will be argued that there are ontological, epistemological
 and political reasons for rejecting Bhaskar's concept of 'alethic
 truth'. This is consistent with my reclamation of metaphysical truth
 for educational research and defence of correspondence.
 4. ALETHIC TRUTH, PRACTICAL ADEQUACY AND CONCOMITANCE:
 BEYOND CORRESPONDENCE?
 Bhaskar's 'Alethic Truth'
 For Bhaskar, truth seems simultaneously (a) the simplest and (b) the
 most difficult of concepts. In relation to (a), he writes that:
 Saying 'true' to a proposition is to give one's assent to it - this is
 its primary function, whereby redundancy and performative
 theories derive their plausibility. But one is thereby committed to
 a claim about the world, roughly to the effect that is how things
 are, from which correspondence theories since the time of Aris-
 totle have drawn their currency... (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 214)
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 However, in relation to (b), he writes: 'But "truth" is at the same time
 the most difficult of concepts in which ... there is hardly an extant
 theory without some flaw but in which it is not hard to recognise
 some truth or power' (p. 215). In commenting upon the corre-
 spondence theory of truth, he notes that the basic objection to the
 most influential correspondence theories (the early Wittgenstein's
 picture theory, Tarski's semantic theory and Popper's theory of
 increasing truth-likeness) applies to all, namely that there is no
 'Archimedean' standpoint from which a comparison of the compet-
 ing items can be made. For Bhaskar, then, given the rejection of
 immediate knowledge, the recognition that matching is a metaphor
 and that semantic theories are homologous, 'it seems that corre-
 spondence theories must be abandoned' (Bhaskar, 1993, p. 215).
 Contrary to Bhaskar, it will be argued that his ostensible move away
 from correspondence to his notion of 'alethic truth' is fatally flawed:
 correspondence would do justice to critical realism understood as a
 theory of knowledge rather than as a theory of truth (Groff, 2000).
 The equivocal nature of 'it seems that correspondence theories
 must be abandoned' is due to the fact that Bhaskar cannot dispense
 with correspondence in some form. I would suggest that it is not cor-
 respondence per se that is flawed, but rather some of the forms it has
 taken (hence the dismissal of Wittgenstein's 'picture theory', for
 example). He has asserted that alethic truth is 'a species of ontolo-
 gical truth constituting and following on the truth of, or real rea-
 son(s) for.., .things, as distinct from propositions' (Bhaskar, 1994,
 p. 251). This is clearly an extension of metaphysical truth, for now
 alethic truth is a predicate of things as distinct from propositions: it
 is an ontic rather than epistemic phenomenon. Alethic truths are
 the underlying processes, mechanisms and structured properties
 that both natural and social scientists seek to identify. Thus, for
 example, the alethic truth of a teacher's capacity to issue a detention
 is the causal structure of the school and its wider structural embed-
 ding. Many would (rightly) wish to query this: for could it not be that
 the teacher's capacity derives from other, equally important sources
 that may or may not be contingently related to the school qua struc-
 ture? The language of alethic truth is problematic and must be
 rejected for three reasons.
 First, and fundamentally, there is the ontological objection. Essen-
 tially, it is improper to equate truth with states of affairs: while they
 are related they are not the same sort of thing. In his earlier work,
 Groff notes that Bhaskar (rightly) insisted that ideas are not to be
 mistaken for underlying causal mechanisms. As she notes, in his Real-
 ist Theory of Science (1978), truth belongs on the epistemological side
 347
 ? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. and SCSE 2002
This content downloaded from 
            139.184.14.150 on Tue, 12 Oct 2021 07:14:23 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 RECLAIMING METAPHYSICAL TRUTH FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
 of an epistemology/ontology divide. (Remember that truth is meta-
 physical and not epistemic, though Groff's argument that truth is
 not to be conflated or confused with the intransitive dimension is
 correct.) For Groff, the issue is how one is to register the complaint
 that, by identifying truth with causality, Bhaskar has committed a cat-
 egory error. She suggests (Groff, 2000, p. 412) that the way to pro-
 ceed is to ask, 'What sound reason (s) might there be, if any, to
 assume that truth is not purely ideational, and to therefore regard as
 legitimate the use of the term to refer to generative mechanisms?'
 Before addressing this question, however, two points need to be
 made. First, alethic truth is an inherently equivocal concept peculiar
 in that while it designates ontic phenomena (e.g. education system),
 its use in any given instance enjoins that certain epistemic conditions
 have been met, i.e. agreed on as being the real reason for some given
 phenomenon (Groff, 2000, p. 413). Second, Bhaskar has not
 rejected the idea that other kinds of truth may pertain to the evalu-
 ation of propositions, which brings us to back to metaphysical truth
 (i.e. relational property). The issue, then, is whether truth should be
 extended to incorporate material causality. Now, in terms of whe-
 ther there may be sound reasons to refer to generative mechanisms
 as truths, Bhaskar has in fact not provided any reasons, sound or
 otherwise. It is simply an assertion. At the end of the day, the term
 alethic truth itself 'tells us only, and only indirectly, that we must
 already have come to certain epistemic conclusions. Far from author-
 ising such judgements, it presupposes that they have already been
 made on grounds which the concept of alethic truth does not itself
 specify' (Groff, 2000, p. 415).
 The second reason is that epistemologically the concept of alethic
 truth makes it seem as though issues of justification and of theory
 preference have been resolved. In fact, there is an absence of explicit
 discussion of justification in Bhaskar's work. For Groff, alethic truth
 is a substitute for the intransitive realm in authorising judgmental
 rationality, which is wholly inadequate. Instead, adequate theorising
 of judgmental rationality is urgently required.
 The third is that politically (although, as Groff notes, the issues
 are epistemic) it will be more likely that critical realism will be mis-
 taken for a form of epistemological hubris. Instead, Bhaskar would
 be well advised to return to his earlier acceptance of fallibility (in the
 transitive realm of activity and knowledge production). Indeed, the
 claim that truth is grounded in things is to commit the ontic fallacy.
 Truth is a concept that refers us to states of affairs and, quite simply,
 our predicative practices are unintelligible without a notion of
 things either being or not being the case.
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 Now, it would make sense to develop my defence of correspond-
 ence at this juncture. However, it is important briefly to look at how
 leading critical social realists wrestle with truth, since there is an all-
 too-hasty rejection of both truth qua regulative norm and corres-
 pondence. As we have seen, Bhaskar's (equivocal) rejection of
 correspondence stems from his rejection of Wittgenstein's picture
 theory, inter alia, and the fact that there can be no Archimedean
 standpoint. Andrew Sayer echoes this:
 This scepticism [about truth] arises from a realization that we
 cannot escape to an Archimedean position from where we can see
 how discourse and reality, statements and their objects, compare,
 and from a recognition that the world can only be known under
 certain particular descriptions... Under these circumstances,
 and bearing in mind that knowledge and the world to which it
 refers are mostly different kinds of things, what could it mean to
 say we know the truth about something? And how could we know
 we had arrived at the truth? Naive ideas about 'reality checks',
 about finding some simple formula for discovering the truth and
 guaranteeing 'realistic theory' must be abandoned. History makes
 fools of those who claim to have discovered the truth in some
 absolute, ultimate sense, because even if their claims are not
 directly falsified, the concepts on which they are framed may be
 succeeded by different, more powerful ones. (Sayer, 2000, p. 40)
 First, it is a non sequitur to distil a disabling scepticism from the fact
 that knowledge and reality are different kinds of things. Equally,
 issues of epistemology (how can we know) only make sense in virtue
 of the fact that truth is to be had, so to speak. It seems to me that
 the main problem is that realists like Sayer mistakenly accept the
 metaphorical nature of such XFiles-type catchphrases as 'The Truth
 is Out There', that is, timeless and anterior to human (transitive)
 inquiry. As we have seen, the notion that truth (or what Bhaskar
 unhelpfully re-works as alethic truth) is ontological is to commit
 both idealist and ontic fallacies. As Groff argues, truth tells us nothing
 about actual or potential states of affairs and thus must not be conflated
 with substantive knowledge-claims. However, it is clear that Sayer has
 ended up in a cul-de-sac partly because of confusion surrounding
 absolute truth, which we have already discussed. Indubitably, con-
 cepts are succeeded, but precisely because they do not correspond
 with reality. Here, there is no 'simple formula', as Sayer puts it, for
 discovering truth. Either our propositions instantiate truth or they
 do not: how we arrive at truth is distinct and separate from truth
 itself.
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 Layder versus Sayer: Concomitance Theory of Truth versus Practical
 Adequacy
 As we have seen, in Sayer's case the notion of absolute has confused
 matters. Yet both Bhaskar and Sayer cannot dispense with corre-
 spondence. In his widely-acclaimed second edition of Method in Social
 Science: A Realist Approach, Sayer writes the following:
 Perhaps the main problem concerns how something as immater-
 ial as a concept or statement or equation can be said to be 'true
 of', 'correspond to' or 'represent' something material. If you
 think about this, the normally hidden metaphorical nature [sic] of
 such terms as 'correspondence' becomes apparent... (Sayer,
 1992, p. 67)
 He then reiterates the impossibility of absolute truth and emphasises
 (correctly) the fallible nature of knowledge. Interestingly, a few sen-
 tences on, he argues that the (realist) admission that all knowledge
 is fallible does not mean that all knowledge is equally fallible (contra
 irrationalism and relativism). This is a back-door way of admitting
 that some of our knowledge is true: knowledge cannot be 'more'
 fallible9. In questioning received notions about truth, he notes that
 the question ought to be a disturbing one 'as the idea of truth has a
 vital role in society. It is quite understandable that people should be
 wary of letting go of such a concept, but some accommodation must
 be made between notions of fallibility and truth' (p. 68). Of course,
 he does not let go of truth; instead, he attempts unsuccessfully to
 qualify it or redefine it as 'practical adequacy', which itself presup-
 poses metaphysical truth. There is no need whatsoever to make an
 accommodation between fallibility and truth, since they presuppose
 each other.
 He suggests that it may help the reader to replace or modify the con-
 cept of truth with that of practical adequacy. Yet which is it to be? If
 one opts for modification, to what extent and what is being left out?
 Replacement and modification are miles apart and have quite differ-
 ent ramifications for substantive research! These are not spelled out.
 However, in concluding his section on truth, he candidly admits that
 it is not easy 'to find good substitutes for terms like "truth"... and
 "correspondence", but if they are to be continued to be used, we
 must keep in mind the shortcomings of superficial interpretations
 which ignore the crucial and radical difference between thought
 objects and real objects...' (p. 71). Ironically, it is precisely the
 superficial theories of correspondence that warrant critical discus-
 sion, not a rejection of correspondence per se (which is why Sayer
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 cannot avoid it). Indeed, it is in virtue of the fact that our knowledge
 of reality is conceptually mediated that underscores the untenability
 of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. What is needed here is
 rigour, not superficiality, but Sayer's conflation of practical adequacy
 and truth undercuts the sophisticated critical social realism he has
 developed (e.g. Sayer, 1995). In his latest book Realism and Social Sci-
 ence (Sayer, 2000), he notes that it is common to associate realism
 with correspondence theories of truth as opposed to conventionalist
 theories of truth. He reiterates the argument that correspond cannot
 mean 'mirror' or 'reproduce', for the relation between knowledge
 and its referents is not like that of mirroring an object or reprodu-
 cing or representing a copy of it. However, he remains equivocal
 about retaining correspondence.
 If we are to allow a notion of correspondence, it must involve
 conformability and intelligibility rather than replicability. Realists
 do not need to suppose that knowledge mirrors the world; rather
 it interprets it in such a way that expectations and practices it
 informs are intelligible and reliable. (Sayer, 2000, p. 42)
 Pro tem. I want to emphasise that correspondence does not mean
 reproduce or mirror: transcendentally our beliefs cannot be isomor-
 phic with their referents (the theory of surplus value is not the same
 as surplus value). Again, we see that Sayer cannot dispense with cor-
 respondence and remains too bogged down in criticising reproduc-
 tion and mirror metaphors. Unquestionably, realists - and ordinary
 people - do not need to suppose that knowledge mirrors the world,
 but they do need to know that it corresponds (or is congruent) with
 the way things are!
 In reiterating arguments presented in both editions of Method in
 Social Science, Sayer maintains that 'truth might be better understood
 as 'practical adequacy', that is, in terms of the extent to which it gen-
 erates expectations about the world and about results of our actions
 which are realized' (Sayer, 2000, p. 43). Sayer gives the example of
 two statements, effectively that we can/not walk on water. That we
 cannot walk on water is more practically adequate since it generates
 expectations that are realised, namely that we cannot walk on water.
 In lieu of truth, then, for Sayer it makes sense to judge knowledge
 as more or less useful rather than true or false. In his Realist Image in
 Social Science, Derek Layder (1990, p. 55) writes that only insofar as
 Sayer wishes to dispense with notions of truth as exemplified in the
 positivist and conventionalist views then he would not demur. For
 Layder, we cannot abolish truth completely, and the conventionalist
 approach does not do justice to the structures and mechanisms of
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 the social world that operate independently of our knowledge of
 them.
 My question here is: which facets of truth are to be abolished (per
 impossible)? If, as Layder rightly argues, there are social mechanisms
 and structures that operate independently of our knowledge of
 them, then, transcendentally speaking, truth cannot be dispensed
 with, since our true knowledge is that which corresponds with or
 affirms the reality of such mechanisms and structures (why we can-
 not walk on water). However, vis-A-vis 'practical adequacy', Layder
 argues that its most serious drawback is that it completely ignores
 cognitive claims to validity: 'Cognitive adequacy no longer has a role
 to play in arbitrating claims to validity; if knowledge is 'useful' or
 'practically adequate' then somehow whether it is true or false, cor-
 rect or incorrect is neither here nor there' (Layder, 1990, p. 56). In
 contrast, the problem is that 'practical adequacy' cannot avoid cor-
 respondence. As Bridges puts it, 'In other words, true beliefs will
 indeed 'work' (if they have that sort of application) but that they are
 true or false is determined by something else (back to correspondence)
 rather than by the fact that they work' (1999, p. 605, emphasis added).
 Furthermore, Layder points out that when we discuss practical
 adequacy in a social context (e.g. school improvement strategies
 underpinned by school effectiveness research), we are enjoined to
 ask such questions as practically adequate for what and for whom.
 Equally, different kinds of social theoretical knowledge cannot be
 judged in terms of their practical adequacy. 'Certainly, the whole
 edifice of functionalism is practically adequate for functionalists,
 as is ethnomethodology for ethnomethodologists, and Marxism for
 Marxists... there has to be some invocation of cognitive adequacy
 and explanatory power, based ultimately on various truth and valid-
 ity claims...' (Layder, 1990, p. 57). For Engholm, Sayer's position
 results in instrumentalism. He reasons that Sayer finds himself in this
 rather awkward position because 'he for a moment lapses from a
 central critical realist position in which the question of what consti-
 tutes epistemically significant experience, and what the purpose of
 science as such is, is of paramount importance' (2000, p. 18). I
 would argue instead that the lapse is due to confusion about abso-
 lutism and an all-too-fast rejection of correspondence.
 Layder concludes that realists must adopt an alternative notion of
 truth - what he calls 'concomitance' - to the conventionalist and the
 positivist 'correspondence' versions:
 The most appropriate strategy ... would be to adopt some middle
 ground between correspondence and coherence theories of truth.
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 That is, to sustain the notion of reference to external objects of
 knowledge which is implicit in the notion of correspondence,
 without endorsing the ideas that the relationship... is isomorphic.
 (Layder, 1990, p. 58)
 He also adds that we must endorse the correct conventionalist
 notion that the meaning of a concept within theory or conceptual
 network is to some extent dependent upon its interrelations with
 other concepts in the network, yet eschew the epistemic fallacy, that
 is, the notion that objects of knowledge are only constituted within
 theory or discourse. To reiterate, correspondence does not enjoin
 isomorphism. However, Layder does not adequately spell out and
 defend 'concomitance'. He would have been better off simply reject-
 ing correspondence qua isomorphism rather than rejecting corre-
 spondence per se.
 5. DEFENDING CORRESPONDENCE
 For Bridges (1999), correspondence 'has a certain appeal' and is
 closest of the five theories he considers to a common-sense understand-
 ing of what we mean when we claim the truth of a belief. However,
 he believes correspondence has some inherent problems. I argue to
 the contrary here. Bridges was quite right to signal correspond-
 ence as being closest to our common sense understanding, since
 ordinary people could not function without a realist (non-positivist/
 empiricist) notion of correspondence. Bridges quotes Eisner, who
 writes that:
 To assert that we have a correspondence between our views of
 reality and reality itself, we would need to know two things. We
 would need to know reality, as well as our views of it. But if we
 really knew reality as it really is, we would need to have a view of
 it. Conversely, since we cannot have knowledge of reality as it is,
 we cannot know if our views correspond to it. (Eisner, cited in
 Bridges, 1999, p. 602)
 Firstly, it seems to me that the comment 'But if we really knew reality
 as it really is, we would need to have a view of it', is a bizarre tautology.
 Secondly, however, the final sentence is simply a restatement of fal-
 libilism, which I have rejected. Bridges argues that a second difficulty
 derives from an ostensible circularity: 'A proposition is true if it
 corresponds to a fact - but what is a fact, if not a state of affairs rep-
 resented by a true proposition. So how informative is the corre-
 spondence theory?' (idem). A proposition is true if, and only if, it
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 corresponds with actual or potential state of affairs. We simply need
 to accept the final sentence, viz. a fact is a state of affairs represented
 by a true proposition.
 A third problem for Bridges is that states of affairs themselves have
 to be construed in certain ways. This is dangerously close to commit-
 ting the epistemic fallacy. We need to know what is meant by 'con-
 strued in certain ways'. His example here of 'effective management'
 does not render problematic correspondence. 'Effective manage-
 ment' involves value judgments and commitments, which would not
 make sense without correspondence, for we could not condemn new
 managerialism where 'effective management' is about the imposi-
 tion of impersonal mechanisms that increase 'standards' (read:
 examination scores) without our claims about children and how they
 learn corresponding. The point is that any disagreement here only
 makes sense in the context of correspondence.
 A fourth problem concerns how correspondence can be invoked
 to give an account of truth in mathematics, logic or morality. I am
 neither a mathematician nor logician. Notwithstanding, crudely
 speaking, simple addition would be unintelligible without corre-
 spondence (either two plus two equals four or it does not). Equally,
 truth-claims presuppose the logical law of non-contradiction, which
 is a transcendental prerequisite for communication (and all forms of
 individual and social practice). The truth or falsity of immoral beha-
 viour derives from our nature qua human beings, which of course is
 contestable. Such contestability is unintelligible without correspond-
 ence. Verifying truth-claims about immoral behaviour involves tran-
 scendental argumentation about human beings qua natural kind and
 their irreducible powers and liabilities. The salient point here, then,
 is that correspondence is not context-specific. A fifth, final prob-
 lem for Bridges is that correspondence 'tends to see truth as a piece-
 meal characteristic of a fragmentary set of beliefs - with each belief
 being checked separately for its correspondence with the relevant fact'
 (p. 603). A realist theory of correspondence does not enjoin this.
 As we have already seen, we are not in the business of 'stand-alone'
 propositions (many propositions are part of connected clusters).
 So, what does it mean to say the truth corresponds? Above all, it
 seems to me that much confusion is instantly dispelled if we stick to
 correspondence qua agreement or congruence. The Oxford Diction-
 ary defines it as follows:
 Correspond 1 a (usu. foll. by to) be analogous or similar. b (usu.
 foll. by to) agree in amount, position, etc. c (usu. foll. by with, to)
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 be in harmony or agreement. 2. Communicate by interchange of
 letters.
 We must adhere to c, viz. to be in harmony or agreement. Imme-
 diately, notions of isomorphism, mirroring or resemblance do not
 figure. Correspondence is thus definitional and is not a criterion of
 truth. It is also not a resemblance theory. Yet, as Andrew Collier
 (1994) points out, several philosophers, including Bhaskar, reject
 correspondence theory on the grounds that only hold good if that
 theory is taken to involve some notion of the true statement resem-
 bling what it is about.
 But correspondence does not necessarily involve resemblance.
 Everyone understands that if the inspector says 'your inventory
 did not correspond to what was in the warehouse', she is not
 complaining that a sheet of paper did not resemble a stack of
 tinned fruit. 'Correspond' here is specially chosen to pick out the
 relation that holds when as it is said, so it is. This may look a bit
 thin... (b)ut it may be filled out.., .by some such account as
 Bhaskar's, of the deepening of knowledge of the intransitive
 object as explanatory models are tested... (Collier, 1994, p. 240,
 original emphasis)
 As Pring succinctly puts it:
 (I)n rejecting a 'picture theory of meaning', in which a statement
 is said to be true or false depending on whether it 'mirrors'
 accurately the real world, one still cannot get rid of the central element
 of the correspondence theory of truth. That central element is that the
 truth or falsity of what is said has something to do with a reality
 which is independent of the statements made about it. (Pring,
 2000, p. 73, emphasis added)
 Indeed, on this realist conception it is important to make clear that
 this is not the same as having settled on criteria of validity. Collier
 should not be perturbed by his 'thin' definition of correspondence,
 for truth qua formal, regulative norm tells us nothing about actual or
 potential states of affairs. As Groff reiterates, truth must be distin-
 guished from states of affairs themselves. 'While the norm has an
 ontic component... this formal condition implies neither (1) that
 truth is a predicate of states of affairs rather than propositions,
 nor ... (2) that states of affairs ought to be regarded as truth bearers'
 (Groff, 2000, p. 428). In other words, such phrases as 'the truth of
 the matter' or 'the truth shall set you free' must be acknowledged to
 be metaphors.
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 6. TRUTH, REALISM AND EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
 As David Scott (2000) notes, the field of education is riven with dis-
 putes, not least about the veracity of different research approaches.
 Such disputes are almost invariably conducted at the level of method
 without much regard for matters of ontology and epistemology. Yet,
 as he argues, it is only at these levels that the real issues are foremost.
 Scott identifies three broad positions in relation to these debates:
 naive realism, radical relativism and transcendental realism. How-
 ever, the point I wish to make here is that such debates are quintes-
 sentially about the pursuit of truth. Furthermore, this pursuit cannot
 avoid the nature of social reality itself. For Bridges:
 Correspondence theory - or something like it - is intimately
 associated with classical scientific or empiricist research, in which
 typically the researcher is combining the collection of data from
 a (perceived) external world and recording it in a way which
 faithfully reflects the data. (1999, p. 609)
 Here, I want to reiterate that we must distinguish between ontology,
 method and correspondence: whatever the nature and extent of
 intimacy between correspondence and empiricism, for example,
 they are not the same and must not be conflated. For critiques
 of empiricism are possible by virtue of the fact that its secreted onto-
 logy does not correspond with reality (see Scott, 2000; Willmott,
 2002).
 I want to end this paper by way of underscoring the fact that edu-
 cational research is about the pursuit of truth and, at the same time,
 such pursuit involves ontological commitments that may or may not
 correspond with educational realities. That is, in educational re-
 search (as in any field of study) the nature of what exists cannot be
 unrelated to how it is studied, what is held to exist (ontology) shapes
 considerations about how it should be explained. As Archer (1998)
 argues, social ontology plays a regulative role vis-a-vis the explanatory
 methodology for the reason that it conceptualises social reality
 in certain terms. Conversely, regulation is mutual, since what is held
 to exist cannot remain immune from what does exist: 'Such consistency
 is a general requirement and it usually requires continuous two-way
 adjustment between ontology and methodology to achieve and sus-
 tain it as such' (Archer, 1998, p. 17). For example, I have argued
 that the nature of social reality had led to a re-examination of previous
 assumptions on the part of some influential school effectiveness
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 researchers, in particular the (belated) incorporation of struc-
 tural inequality and an acknowledgement of socio-political systems
 (Willmott, 1999b, 2002).
 Archer argues that the constituent elements of social theorising
 are threefold, that none is dispensable and that each exerts a regu-
 latory role on the other as follows: Social Ontology (SO) - Explan-
 atory Methodology (EM) - Practical Social Theory (PST). As I have
 said, the relationship between SO and EM consists in maintaining
 that what is held to exist must condition how it is to be explained.
 However, it is not the case that the relationship between the two is
 one of logical implication, since 'it must remain possible to hold that
 some things exist socially which carry no particular implications
 about how we should study them or what importance should be
 assigned to them in explanations' (Archer, 1998, p. 72). Practical
 social theorists do not directly derive their propositions from SO or
 its congruent EMs, since many of the latter can be compatible with
 the former.
 The nature of different social ontologies and their associated
 methods of explanation are manifested stronger at a particular
 level of PST or with specific time spans. Thus, for example,
 Individualists, insisting that the ultimate constituents of the social
 world were individual people.., .next adduced related explanat-
 ory injunctions (methodological individualism) which worked
 more convincingly... at the level of interpersonal relations,
 confined to those taking place between contemporary individuals.
 (Archer, 1998, p. 73)
 The reason for stressing the tripartite connections stems from the
 fact that we cannot simply gather substantive findings, which derive
 from different ontological assumptions as transmitted through their
 cognate explanatory methodologies.
 For example, in proffering the theoretical resources with which
 school effectiveness researchers might profitably enhance their
 work, Lauder et al. rightly pose the question of the relative autonomy
 of schools and the ways in which they may or may not be able to
 mediate external influences:
 The general point here is not that a position should be taken on
 the question of relative autonomy but rather to document the
 various circumstances in which schools may or may not be able
 to mediate external forces. In this sense the basic postulate
 should not be the closed assumption that schools are relatively
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 autonomous but rather the question of the conditions under
 which they might be relatively autonomous. (Lauder et al. 1998,
 p. 64)
 Lauder et al. are providing a PST, since PST is propositional: in this
 instance they enjoin that we provide a specification of the conditions
 under which agency is conditioned to pursue change or engage in
 replication. In other words, we are talking about specifying the
 degrees of freedom versus stringency of constraints (Archer, 1995;
 Willmott, 1999a, 2002). We now need to take two steps back: the EM
 that underpins the latter specification is analytical dualism, of which
 the SO is a stratified one (see Archer, 1995; Scott, 2000; Willmott,
 1999a, 2001, 2002). Analytical dualism is only possible because struc-
 ture and agency stand in temporal relations of priority and posteri-
 ority. As Archer argues, it is 'because structure and agency are
 phased over different tracts of time [that we are able] to formulate
 practical social theories [PST] in terms of the former being prior to
 the latter, having autonomy from it and exerting a causal influence
 upon it' (Archer, 1996, p. 694).
 We have already seen that there is a growing pragmatist trend in
 educational research (see note 3) whereby practical educational
 research is carried out without reference to ontological and episte-
 mological concerns. For Reynolds, 'rapid progress was made' and,
 for Teddlie, the orientation of many in the USA is to 'act rather than
 reflect'. Teddlie also adds that 'In reality many practitioners are cur-
 rently interested in what could work at their school... [rather] ...
 than in ruminations about social inequalities associated with dif-
 ferent socio-economic classes. "Redistribution" of resources is the
 last thing on their minds' (cited in Thrupp, 2001, p. 447). This com-
 mentary readily lends itself to New Right incorporation, since social
 inequalities, their nature, their impact and their durability are set
 aside in the quest for 'what works' in schools. Of course, the minute
 Reynolds introduces the notion of 'rapid progress', he immediately
 embroils himself in values. The amorality of pragmatic utility whilst
 evident to most continues to fall on deaf ears in some influential
 SE quarters. Cramming 11-year-olds may work in terms of improv-
 ing SATs (Standard Assessment Tasks), but those concerned with
 understanding would maintain otherwise. In essence, pragmatic utility
 uncouples itself from SO and EM. However, all research presupposes
 (or secretes) an ontology. That cramming may work secretes pro-
 positions, wittingly or otherwise, about the nature of children qua
 learners. Furthermore, the work of Reynolds and Teddlie also secretes
 an implicit voluntarism that can only be entertained on the basis of
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 a denial of sui generis emergent structural and cultural properties,
 that is, a 'depthless' SO (see Willmott, 2002).
 7. CONCLUSION
 This paper has reclaimed metaphysical truth for educational
 research and defended the correspondence theory of truth, of
 which the generic equivocal rejection is largely attributable to some
 of the ways in which it has been erroneously theorised. Fundament-
 ally, correspondence may formally be described in the following
 terms: a statement (proposition, belief) is true if and only if what the
 statement says to be the case actually is the case. The pursuit of truth
 (which is instantiated by propositions) is a transcendental condition
 of educational inquiry and research. It tells us nothing about actual
 or potential states of affairs and must therefore not be conflated with
 substantive knowledge claims. To recapitulate, what is clear from the
 foregoing is that realist philosophers and social theorists cannot
 avoid correspondence in some form. That form is quite simple and
 resonates with the ordinary definition. Realist philosophers like
 Bhaskar and social theorists like Sayer have been too preoccupied
 with inadequate (especially positivist) conceptions of correspondence,
 which in turn has led them down intractable culs-de-sac. Instead, I have
 argued that we eschew the misleading conceptions of correspond-
 ence and, at the same time, remember that truth is metaphysical.
 8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 I wish to thank an external reviewer for helpful comments an earlier
 version of this paper; Ruth Groff, whose article made me re-think
 Bhaskar's concept of 'alethic truth'; and Paul Priami, for his constant
 support and insight.
 9. NOTES
 1 Bailey's paper is concerned with the transcendental need for truth qua regulatory
 norm vis-A-vis educational research. This paper extends this transcendental pre-
 requisite in its defence of correspondence (ironically against leading academics
 in the realist camp itself).
 2 Transcendental realism makes claims as to what reality must be like in order to
 enable (social) scientific analysis of which a priori propositions can be advanced.
 Bhaskar's (1978) appropriation of Kant's term 'transcendental' is not done with-
 out qualification. The difference consists in the fact that while Kant's arguments
 lead to a theory about the structure-imposing power of the mind vis-A-vis the
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 world, Bhaskar's lead to extra-discursive conclusions, namely about what the
 world must be like. This is where Bhaskar parts company with Kant, since we are
 not dealing with unknowable things-in-themselves (noumena). See Scott (2000)
 and Willmott (2002, chapter 1) for discussion of transcendental realism in edu-
 cational research.
 3 In fact, at present the field of educational research internationally is witnessing
 a pragmatist trend, whereby practical research is carried out without reference to
 ontological and epistemological concerns. For David Reynolds, a leading UK
 school effectiveness academic, 'Precisely because we did not waste time on phil-
 osophical discussion or on values debates, we made rapid progress' (1998, p. 20).
 Equally, for Teddlie, 'The orientation of many in the US is to do rather than to
 reflect...' (Teddlie and Reynolds, 2000, p. 27).
 4 Thus, to Martyn Hammersley:
 ... there is no escape from philosophical assumptions for researchers. Whether
 we like it or not, we cannot avoid such assumptions. And, sometimes, the assump-
 tions that we make lead us into error. I believe that this is the case with some of
 the key epistemological ideas current among ethnographers ... At the centre of
 these problems is the doctrine of realism, by which I mean the idea that there is
 a reality independent of the researcher whose nature can be known, and that the
 aim of research is to produce accounts that correspond to that reality... It is a
 position on which much ethnography is founded (1992, p. 43).
 This is a clear summary of the realist position. Ontology and epistemology are
 kept separate, thereby avoiding the epistemic and ontic fallacies respectively.
 That is, realist research does not endorse the view that statements about being
 can be reduced to, or analysed in terms of, statements about knowledge or the
 reduction of knowledge to its object. Furthermore, that our assumptions may
 lead us into error underscores the fallibility of knowledge-claims. Finally, any
 account either corresponds or does not correspond with the ways things are (or
 have been): they are true or false.
 5 For a useful discussion of non-realist theories see Kirkham (1992, pp. 73-118)
 and Bridges (1999, pp. 603-608). I do not discuss such theories here, since they
 all have in common the view that extra-mental reality or the '(extra-mental) facts'
 have nothing to do with truth or falsity.
 6 Last semester, a significant proportion of first-year undergraduates asserted that
 matters of truth and falsity are not important. And for one senior colleague, con-
 tradictory theories are simply 'different'; they are not right or wrong (or true or
 false). This begs the question of the rationale of theorising.
 7 As Norris (1994, p. 162) argues, relativist arguments 'ignore the extent to which
 past theories are often not so much discredited en bloc as conserved and refined
 through the ongoing process of scientific elaboration and critique'.
 "8 Whilst I do not wish to detract overly from the key purpose of this paper, it is
 important to anticipate that some would want to query the idea that educational
 institutions and practices are intransitive, i.e. that the social world is independent
 of our knowledge of it. Very briefly, Sayer argues that although social practices
 are concept-dependent, it does not mean that they are identical with the con-
 cepts on which they depend. Whilst I would prefer concept-linked (see Willmott,
 2002), the salient point is that while the concepts used by actors (implicitly or
 explicitly) are necessary for an explanation of their practices, they are not suffi-
 cient, 'for they are not only likely to be flawed but to mask or misrepresent cer-
 tain aspects ...' (Sayer, 2000, p. 34). Moreover, socially produced or constructed
 phenomena such as institutions are independent of the 'constructions' (in the
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 sense of interpretations or descriptions) that researchers have of them. How else
 can we account for the Marxist corpus and the objective reality of the capital/
 labour relation?
 9 Even metaphorically, this would still confuse matters, since such grounds presup-
 pose the validity of truth-claims.
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